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Abstract
We discuss potential market mechanisms for the GRID. A
complete dynamical model of a GRID market is defined with
three types of agents. Providers, middlemen and users ex-
change universal GRID computing units (GCUs) at varying
prices. Providers and middlemen have strategies aimed at
maximizing profit while users are ’satisficing’ agents, and
only change their behavior if the service they receive is
sufficiently poor or overpriced. Preliminary results from
a multi-agent numerical simulation of the market model
shows that the distribution of price changes has a power
law tail.
1 Introduction
From the hardware point of view the GRID is a collec-
tion of computing, storage and networking devices. At first
glance it looks like standard cluster computing. However,
the GRID is equipped with middleware that makes it easy
for the user to find resources. A good analogy is the Inter-
net where search engines are the “information middleware”
that bring clients and services together [11].
There are currently two main options for middleware:
Globus [1] and Legion [2]. Ideally the GRID should be
a heterogeneous collection of computing equipment. At
present it runs on LINUX machines.
Currently only a few GRIDs exists. In the UK there are
two main GRIDs, one is used by computer scientists to de-
velop middleware and architectures. The other, GridPP, is
used particle theorists. Soon this effort will be enlarged to
cope with the data created by the Large Hadron Collider at
CERN. Other scientists are starting to use GRID technol-
ogy for their purposes. Another pool of potential users are
banking and insurance companies where computational ap-
plications are intensive. Further afield but no less important
are game companies beginning to look at how they can use
GRID technology.
2 The future of the GRID
A consensus exists in the research community that the
GRID, if it is successful, will be used in a commercial con-
text. For instance, companies may specialise in providing
GRID services in a similar way telephone companies op-
erate today. A second scenario is that large organizations
will sell spare computing power to others. A third scenario
sees private PC owner selling spare CPU cycles of their ma-
chines. Since the GRID is, in a way, meant to do away with
the PC this seems a less likely option. In this paper we
present a market model for the first scenario.
3 Charging for computing time
The name “GRID” was chosen in analogy with the elec-
trical power grid. Just as electrical appliances are plugged
into a socket, computing applications are plugged into the
GRID. So, it is only a matter of time until GRID providers
will want to sell computing power to end users. In that case,
providers will develop charging schemes for their services
in a competitive environment.
We expect that, similar to electricity markets, few ne-
gotiations will occur between producers and end users. In
the privatised electricity market, middlemen buy electricity
from producers and sell it to end users through a range of
service plans and tariffs. In fact, detailed multi-agent sim-
ulations of the UK and other electricity markets have been
made [4].
For the GRID, an additional complication arises since
consumption can not be measured easily. The user needs
several components to perform a computation: CPU, disks,
memory and networking. If one of these components is
missing all others loose their value. For simplicity, we as-
sume that in the future a universal “GRID computing unit”
(GCU) will be established. In fact this may simply be mea-
sured in real time access like telephone usage. In this case
middlemen would make contracts that specify the minimum
number of CPUs, memory, etc. that they supply for specific
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time periods. Payments in the GRID-world could be made
in a similar way utility/phone bills are settled nowadays.
Charging for computer access, or indeed any commodity,
service, etc., can have two different goals:
• maximisation of utilization, or fair access to machines
that have been purchased collectively
• profit maximisation.
In this paper we assume that providers and middleman
endeavor to maximise their profit using some strategies,
or rules of thumb. End users, on the other hand, are not
viewed as utility maximizing agents, but rather as ’satisfic-
ing’ agents who maintain their behavior unless they become
dissatisfied, a description of human economic behavior put
forward Simon [19]. These agents want to lessen their ef-
fort and do not make detailed investigations into the mar-
ket. Producers, middlemen and users interact via auctions
or commodity markets, or a combination of both.
4 Background
There is a substantial body of literature in the statisti-
cal physics community for agent based models of markets.
For example, Bak, Paczuski and Shubik [6] made simple
models of the stock market and found that large variations
in prices were due to a crowd effect, where agents imi-
tate each other’s behavior. More elaborate models of the
London stock exchange have been made by Farmer and
collaborators [24, 13]. Bak, Norrelykke and Shubik [5]
found that the value of money, which is not determined (or
even addressed) in equilibrium economic theory, is due to
a dynamical symmetry breaking in networks of interacting
agents with bounded rationality. Challet and Zhang [10]
introduced the ’minority model’ as a perspicuous adapta-
tion of Arthur’s ”El Farol Bar Problem” [3], where agents
with bounded rationality compete for limited resources and
their strategies co-evolve. Nagel, Shubik and Strauss [14]
showed that a separation of time scales if often needed for a
well-defined market to self-organize. It is with this general
background that we approach the problem of modelling a
potential GRID market.
The oldest record of a charging system for computer ac-
cess that we are aware of is from Sutherland in 1968 [21]. A
large body of literature from the 70’s looked into charging
for access to mainframe computers [15, 12].
More recently authors have begun to investigate a possi-
ble commodity market created by the GRID. There is “G-
commerce” [23] which looks at auctions and commodity
markets. The “Compute Power Market” approach is more
focussed on a completely heterogeneous market with sup-
plier and consumers of all sizes [8]. There is also cpu charg-
ing (SPAWN) [22] and Popcorn [17] and a scheme based
on CUMULUS [20]. Authors have also explored auction-
ing systems as replacements for scheduling algorithms [9].
For completeness we mention ideas from the mobile agent
community where financial ideas are used to manage mo-
bile agents [7].
5 Our model
In our model there are three types of agents: the GRID,
middlemen and users. Though the GRID is likely to be at
least several organizations, in our present model there is
only one GRID provider. The GRID provides GCU’s to
the collection of middlemen at a constant rate. Each mid-
dleman passes his GCUs to his user base. Middlemen do
not exchange with other middlemen and users cannot inter-
act with the GRID directly. This setup is very similar to the
Resource Allocation Game [18], an extension of the minor-
ity model [10]. However, in this case we have the additional
structure of a market and a charging scheme. Our model has
two time scales, a fast one and a slow one.
Users
GridUsers
Users
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Middleman
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Figure 1. Diagram of the model.
With each tick at the fast time scale, the GRID produces
a fixed number of GCUs. These are auctioned off to the
middlemen who put in a bid for the number of GCUs they
expect to need at the next tick to satisfy the demand of their
users. The GRID allocates the GCUs to the middlemen by
serving the highest bids first. If there is a greater demand
than supply, some middlemen do not get any or all of the
GCUs they bid for, and do not pay for unprovided GCUs. If
there is oversupply, the GRID destroys GCUs. The number
of GCUs each middleman bids for is determined by the past
demand of his current users. He bids all his cash supply ex-
cept a small safety margin. So the price each middleman is
prepared to pay for a single GCU is simply his cash supply,
minus a safety margin, divided by the number GCUs he is
bidding for.
Each user may demand one GCU from her respective
middleman at each tick. Users are characterized by the
probability q that they demand use, which is chosen from
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a uniform distribution in the unit interval. If a user requests
a GCU, she pays her middleman immediately at the agreed
price if she actually receives the GCU. If the middleman
cannot deliver a GCU, because he has got none left, there is
no charge for the demand. The middlemen use the money
they collect this way for their next bid to the GRID.
At the slow time scale, each middleman decides whether
to change his current price pt for providing GCUs to his
users. His decision depends on the cash supply he currently
holds Ct, the amount of cash he started out with initially,
C0, and the current average price 〈p〉t offered by the mid-
dlemen:
pt+1 =


pt/2 if Ct > 2C0
pt if C0 < Ct ≤ 2C0
〈p〉t if Ct < C0.
The amount of initial cash C0 can vary from middleman to
middleman, but must be positive.
The first rule stops inflation and might be thought of as
intervention by a regulator or the tax authorities. The sec-
ond rule preserves the status quo (don’t fix it if it ain’t bro-
ken). The last rule is likely to make the middleman’s price
more attractive to users.
At the same time users decide whether to change mid-
dlemen. Their decision is based on two indicators: service
quality and price change. At each tick they make a note
whether their demand was satisfied and compute their ser-
vice quality, S, as the fraction of ticks their demand was
satisfied. (Middlemen may run out of GCUs if they have
not secured enough in the GRID auction.) The average ser-
vice level achieved by all brokers is 〈S〉. A user changes
her middleman if
sTol <
〈S〉 − S
〈S〉
where sTol is the tolerance level of a particular user. Sim-
ilarly, users dislike price hikes. If Pnew is the new price
offered by her middleman, P old the previous price and 〈P 〉
the previous average price over all middlemen, a user will
change her middleman if
cT ol <
Pnew − P old√
〈P 〉P old
where cT ol is her price tolerance level. Each user has
her own price and service tolerance level which are fixed
throughout the simulation. If a user is unsatisfied according
to either criteria, she picks a new middleman at random.
In numerical simulations, we used 10,000 ticks at the fast
time scale for every update at the slow time scale. This
roughly approximates the scale separation between minutes
and months.
6 Preliminary Results
We implemented the model described above as a multi-
agent simulation. To get some indication how the model
behaves we ran a configuration with 10 middlemen and 100
users demanding 50 GCUs on average whilst the GRID pro-
duces 40, 45 and 50 GCUs. The tolerance levels for price
changes and service were set to 0.5 for all users. The ini-
tial cash supply for all middlemen was set to C0 = 21. We
consider the average prices offered by the middlemen and
look at the distribution of changes in this market index from
one update at the long time scale to the next. As shown in
Figures 2 and 3, the distribution is very broad indicating a
high volatility of the market. In fact a double-logarithmic
plot reveals that the price changes are scale invariant with a
critical index ≈ 1.3, as shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 2. A half-logarithmic plot of the prob-
ability distribution of market average price
changes.
When an oversupply of GCUs exists, the model quickly
reaches a monopoly state with all users trapped by one mid-
dleman, as their service level is satisfactory and the price
does not change any further. In the case of oversupply the
price becomes fixed in time, while for undersupply the price
exhibits a complicated dynamics. The balance between sup-
ply and demand rates can therefore be considered as a type
of absorbing state phase transition point [16]. Ideally, one
would like to make supply and demand balanced by market
forces, or “self-organized” in the model rather than preset.
7 Future work
Future investigations into models for the GRID mar-
ket need to consider simple models to understand what re-
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Figure 3. A double logarithmic plot of the dis-
tribution of positive price changes. The price
changes exhibit a fat tail with a power law in-
dex, or slope on the log-log scale ≈ −1.3.
ally drives the system, as well as look at different auction
schemes and ways to model user behavior. Additionally we
need a more satisfactory pricing mechanism, perhaps like
ones used in the electricity markets.
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